

# Arrests, Internments, and Deportations of Swiss Jews in France, and the Reactions of Swiss Authorities, 1941–1944

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**Hundreds of Swiss Jews were living in France when Germany attacked and conquered it in mid-1940. Antisemitic laws came into force soon thereafter. One question was whether these measures would apply to citizens of a neutral state. German and French authorities did apply such laws, for instance, interning approximately sixty Swiss Jews in the Northern Zone. The present study focuses on the arrests, internments, and occasional deportations of Swiss Jews living in France, and the often feeble efforts of Swiss diplomats and other authorities to extricate them. The haunting question remains how much more could have been done.**

In overviews of the number of Jewish victims of National Socialism, Switzerland is usually left out. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, for instance, does not include Switzerland on the list of countries in their estimates of Jewish losses.<sup>1</sup> A map produced by the German Federal Agency for Civic Education listing the Jews killed by the Nazis by country leaves Switzerland blank.<sup>2</sup> At first sight, such an omission is easily comprehensible. Switzerland was never occupied or dominated by the National Socialist regime, and it thus appears unlikely that Swiss citizens would have become victims of National Socialist persecution.

In 1956, however, the Swiss authorities joined other West European states in claiming compensation from the Federal Republic of Germany for Swiss citizens who had suffered from National Socialist persecution. The German compensation laws—the Bundesergänzungsgesetz of 1953 and the revised Bundesentschädigungsgesetz of 1956—were based on the principle of territoriality, and thus compensated only persons who had lived on German territory as of 1937. In this context, the Swiss authorities determined that more than 1,000 Swiss victims of Nazi persecution had not been compensated because they had lived in countries that had come under Nazi occupation only during the war. The large majority of these victims (more than 600) had lived in France at the time of their persecution. Around 400 of the victims had been persecuted for reasons of political opposition, more than 200 merely because they were Jews. Compensation claims brought forward by these people referred to both material losses and damages to life and limb.<sup>3</sup>

Even though it went on for several years, the Swiss compensation process received little attention from the public. To this day, the fact that Swiss nationals were victims of National Socialist persecution remains largely absent from the Swiss collective memory of World War II, and a lot of research remains to be done. Even when the connections between Switzerland and National Socialist Germany were researched in the mid-1990s by the Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland-Second World War, the matter of Swiss victims of National Socialist persecution—a relative sideshow—was left out.<sup>4</sup>

Here I concentrate on Swiss Jews arrested and interned in the German Occupied Zone of France between 1941 and 1944, as well as those arrested in the Unoccupied Zone by the collaborationist regime centered in Vichy and then transferred to Drancy, an internment camp on the outskirts of Paris and administrated first by the French but from June 1943 by the Germans. I have so far identified around sixty Swiss Jews who were arrested, interned, and, in around a dozen cases, deported to German camps outside of France.<sup>5</sup> Their files can be found at various locations in the Swiss Federal Archive in Berne;<sup>6</sup> the records of the consulates that had been responsible for them; the documents of the Federal Department of the Exterior, in particular of the Division of Foreign Affairs (DAE); or the holdings of the Commission for the Compensation of Swiss Victims of National Socialist Persecution.<sup>7</sup> Some cases are very well documented, whereas others consist of only a few pages. Who were these Swiss Jewish nationals, and what were the reasons for their internment? What happened to them? Who was released, who was deported to concentration or death camps? What did Swiss diplomats in Paris, Vichy, and other French cities, or the federal authorities in Berne, undertake in order to achieve their co-nationals' liberation? How did the attitudes and actions of the Swiss diplomats compare to those of other neutrals? (If most Swiss Jews went unharmed, their experience would not find reflection in the archival documents).

### Swiss Jews in Wartime France

Antisemitic laws and other measures came into effect across France in August and September 1940, soon after Germany had occupied the northern part of the country. Even though these laws came into force after the occupation, it is generally agreed today that the Vichy regime proactively enacted and enforced the first anti-Jewish laws, which would later be valid in all of France, without pressure from the Germans.<sup>8</sup> The first Vichy laws and measures mainly targeted Jews without French citizenship. The latter were excluded from employment in the public sector, as well as from occupations within medicine and law. A further law enabled revocation of the citizenship of Jews who had been naturalized after 1927.<sup>9</sup> The first German ordinances against Jews within the Northern Zone in September 1940 defined Jews and compelled those who fell under this definition to register with the authorities. Moreover, Jewish shop-owners were forced to designate their stores as “Jewish.”<sup>10</sup>

The Vichy Regime followed with the so-called Statut des Juifs, a law dating from October 3, 1940. Like the German ordinance, this law also defined Jews, but had a broader definition than the German one. The law barred Jews from many professions, thus furthering their political and societal exclusion.<sup>11</sup> The following day, a second law enabled police prefects throughout France to intern foreign Jews without having to declare any reason.<sup>12</sup> Somewhat later, the Loi du 22 juillet 1941 introduced “Aryanization” of Jewish-owned businesses, real estate, and personal financial assets, intensifying the political and societal exclusion of the Jews.<sup>13</sup>

At the time of the German occupation of the Northern Zone in May 1940, hundreds of Swiss Jews were among the more than 10,000 foreign Jews living in France.<sup>14</sup> For the Swiss Jews, the question was whether the anti-Jewish measures would apply to them as citizens of a neutral state,<sup>15</sup> a question all the more pressing because the German Military Administrator (*Militärbefehlshaber*)—like the Vichy authorities—often explained the anti-Jewish measures as responses to an alleged threat posed by the presence of foreign Jews.<sup>16</sup> With regard to the economic aspects of the laws, as well as identification and registration, it soon became clear that all Jews were being targeted, independent of nationality.<sup>17</sup> Only American Jews were at first exempt from having to mark their businesses with a Jewish star.<sup>18</sup> The neutral countries, including Switzerland, obtained permission from the Nazi

authorities to assign a fellow citizen as the provisional administrator of Jewish-owned businesses.<sup>19</sup> Like Spanish, Italian, Turkish, and Portuguese diplomats and other authorities, the Swiss viewed this solution as benefitting around 160 Swiss-Jewish families, whose assets were considered to be Swiss national property. As did the other neutrals, Switzerland accepted the general idea of sequestering Jewish property, and achieved similar deals with Vichy.<sup>20</sup>

With regard to other anti-Jewish measures, the German and French authorities were more willing to exempt Jewish citizens of neutral countries.<sup>21</sup> Swiss citizens were thus exempted from the German order of June 1942 mandating the wearing of the Jewish star.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, when the Swiss consul in Paris, René Naville,<sup>23</sup> protested soon thereafter against the requisitioning of Swiss Jews' telephones his efforts were rejected. (He claimed that a similar protest by the Spanish consul was also denied).<sup>24</sup> The possibility of exemptions and the vague language of the laws and decrees led to considerable legal uncertainty and regularly required Swiss diplomats to consult with both German and Vichy authorities to determine whether certain measures would apply to Swiss Jews.<sup>25</sup> They turned as well to their colleagues at the consulates of other neutral states for information, including those of the United States and Turkey.<sup>26</sup> Things became more complicated than could have been anticipated: one list prepared at the Swiss Consulate in Paris noted more than ninety laws and decrees against the Jews through the end of 1942 alone.<sup>27</sup>

### Roundups, Arrests, and Internments

Shortly after the October 1940 decree enabling the police to intern foreign Jews, Vichy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Swiss Legation that the measure targeted only stateless Jews, and that the Swiss had nothing to fear.<sup>28</sup> A couple of months later, however, the latter were to learn that neither was true. While some arrests of Swiss citizens took place in the context of roundups of stateless, foreign, and French Jews, in most other cases arrested Swiss Jews were charged with violation of specific anti-Jewish ordinances, or they had committed offenses that would have been treated as minor, or not been illegal at all, for Gentiles—for instance illegally crossing the demarcation line, the only way anyone could travel between the Occupied and Unoccupied Zones. In a few cases the Germans accused Swiss Jews of espionage or treason, usually leading to the offender's deportation to one of the camps in occupied Eastern Europe.

Both German and French police carried out such arrests. In the Northern (Occupied) Zone, it was mainly the Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei, Sipo) that made the arrests, but even so, due to their small number, they often had to call upon the assistance of the French police. In the Southern Zone, the French police more often conducted the roundups and arrests themselves, but in 1943 Vichy—and particularly the police—grew more reluctant to collaborate in the persecution of Jews, especially when the latter were French-born citizens or naturalized before 1927.<sup>29</sup> Following German occupation of the Southern Zone, the Sipo set up local offices, but the French police still played an important role.<sup>30</sup>

The first major roundup that netted Swiss Jews took place in Paris on August 20, 1941.<sup>31</sup> As the Swiss consul reported, four Swiss citizens were interned in Drancy during German retaliatory measures after "Communist" attacks in Paris.<sup>32</sup> While Naville was able to attain the immediate release of one of them (I couldn't determine a name), his interventions on behalf of the others met with "systematic opposition."<sup>33</sup> One of the internees (Gaston Bloch, b. 1896) was released in November "due to health problems."<sup>34</sup> Finally, Georges Schiff (b. 1887) was released on March 28, 1942 conditional upon repatriation to Switzerland. I discovered no specifics about any fourth internee.<sup>35</sup>

While 1941 and 1942 saw several important roundups, for the most part individual arrests predominated in 1943.<sup>36</sup> In November Higher SS and Police Leader (Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer) Carl Albrecht Oberg wrote to the President of Vichy's Council of Ministers Pierre Laval (along with the ministers of the interior, foreign affairs, and information) that from now on, Swiss citizens (like Swedish, Portuguese, Spanish, and others) would also subject to arrest after their governments had first been given the opportunity to repatriate them.<sup>37</sup> Together with growing pressure from the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt, RSHA) to arrest Jews with the purpose of deporting them to camps in the occupied "East," this increased the number of arrests of Swiss Jews in late 1943 and early 1944.<sup>38</sup>

The above cases concerned Swiss Jews caught in roundups by the French police on the order of the Militärbefehlshaber, or by the German police themselves. Some of these roundups supposedly came as retaliation for acts of the "Communist" resistance, while others followed upon demands by the RSHA to deport more Jews.<sup>39</sup> The latter was the case for a roundup in Nice on September 13, 1943 during which Edgar Weil (b. 1881) was arrested.<sup>40</sup> As a rule, these roundups targeted foreign Jews regardless of anything they had actually done;<sup>41</sup> consequently, the German or French authorities usually cited no motives to Swiss diplomats for the arrest of Swiss Jews in these circumstances.

Since several raids were conducted in hospitals and homes for the elderly, some of the interned Swiss Jews were old and frail. Babette Lang-Goetschel (b. 1861), for instance, was arrested during an action in October 1943 and interned at a home for the elderly in Besançon.<sup>42</sup> Céline Levy-Kleeberg (b. 1870) was arrested in a home for the elderly in Paris in February 1944 and interned at the Rothschild Hospital in Paris.<sup>43</sup> That hospital and the adjacent hospice had served as prison hospitals for Drancy since 1941.<sup>44</sup> Remarkably, both Lang-Goetschel and Lévy-Kleeberg were still there at the Liberation on August 17, 1944.

### **Pretended and "Minor" Infractions**

After the end of 1943, Jews were arrested and interned regardless of nationality. Before then, the German and Vichy authorities often provided grounds—usually mere pretexts—for the arrest of Swiss Jews outside the context of roundups. For these arrests (and unlike for those detained during roundups), the Nazis had to provide justifications. Since the Swiss did not question the anti-Jewish policies in general, they did not question the motives for the roundups. Generally, these turned out to be minor infractions, such as an irregularity in someone's papers, or the trading of ration cards: keeping up appearances, so to speak, for the neutrals. Another infraction the Nazis often alleged was unauthorized crossing of the demarcation line between the Northern and Southern Zones.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, as early as in November 1941, newspapers in the Unoccupied Zone announced that foreign Jews who crossed the line illegally would be interned—which did not prevent Jews (both French and foreign) from making the attempt in the hope of escaping the Nazi roundups in the North, which peaked in the second half of 1942.<sup>46</sup>

In any case, the grounds for detention were often phony, as the Swiss authorities soon came to realize. With regard to Swiss citizen Jules-André Blum (b. 1891) Naville noted on April 7, 1942 that the subject had been arrested on July 24, 1941 because of his religion—regardless of the official excuse of dealing in ration cards. Blum had spent three months in the Prison de la Santé and then the internment camps in Drancy and Compiègne, but was finally released on March 14, 1942.<sup>47</sup> A similar case was that of Jacques Weiss (b. 1921), arrested on July 13, 1942 and interned at Poitiers

and then Drancy. The Commander of the Security Police and Security Office (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienst, BdS) responded to the inquiry of the Swiss Consulate in Paris that Weiss had been arrested because he had planned to illegally cross the demarcation line. As Weiss's mother wrote to the Consulate, however, he had been in Poitiers (just inside the Unoccupied Zone) to meet with a colleague; according to her, he had admitted to the charges only after being beaten by the border guards. In November 1942, the chancery clerk of the Swiss Consulate in Paris, Arthur Maurer, pleaded Weiss' case to Obersturmführer Heinz Röthke (one of the chief architects of the deportations from France), along with those of four other Swiss Jews, Weiss's father George, Marcel Adler, Gaston Schmoll, and Jacques Lévy. All had been in Drancy for more than three months, surely long enough, Maurer argued, given their "insignificant offenses."<sup>48</sup> All were indeed liberated and repatriated to Switzerland in the first transport of Jews at the end of January, 1943. The two others left in February and September of that year; some Jews left on regular trains, no easy matter given German control over exit permits.<sup>49</sup>

Among such internees, some were first detained in prisons or internment camps other than Drancy. Generally these had been sentenced during some sort of legal proceeding to a term of imprisonment. After that many (e.g., Georges Weiss and Jacques Lévy) were transferred to the camp of Tourelles or to Drancy under the regulation allowing internment of foreign Jews.<sup>50</sup> Cases of Marcel Adler (b. 1903) and some others the Germans stated cause but either were unable to prove them, or simply did not bother with any legal process at all. Adler was arrested in Paris on July 17, 1942 for "smuggling letters," detained at the prison of Cherche-Midi, and on September 29 interned at Drancy without having been sentenced.<sup>51</sup>

Upon Swiss inquiry into the case of Arthur Bernheim (b. 1891), an unnamed SS-Sturmabführer gave "anti-German activities" as the cause for the Swiss citizen's arrest by the Gestapo in May 1943. Bernheim was first interned in the prison at Limoges, then moved to Compiègne on September 10, and finally two months later to Drancy. The Germans released him on November 24, 1943 on condition that he return to Switzerland.<sup>52</sup> In Berne, the director of the DAE noted that since Bernheim had apparently committed no serious crime, his internment had been due chiefly to his Jewish origins.<sup>53</sup> Here, as in other cases, the Germans used the allegation of sympathy with the Resistance as a mere pretext.

## Deportations to Camps Outside of France

After the deportations of Jews from Drancy to death camps (primarily Auschwitz-Birkenau) in Eastern Europe began at the end of March, 1942, Naville was repeatedly told by the German authorities that Swiss nationals would not be deported.<sup>54</sup> However, as early as July 20, 1942, Selma Rothschild (b. 1895) and her children Julia (b. 1922) and Frédéric-Armand (b. 1924) were deported to Auschwitz a mere five days after their arrest during a July 15, 1942 roundup. Selma and Julia were murdered immediately upon arrival, while Frédéric-Armand (according to Adhémar Wyler, another Swiss Jew who survived Auschwitz,) died a few weeks later.<sup>55</sup> With the Rothschilds being among the first Swiss Jews deported, Naville in Paris and his colleagues in the DAE were slow to realize what had actually happened, even more so because the German authorities had provided no motive for arrest. When the Germans finally claimed that Selma had "volunteered for a labor deployment" in Eastern Europe, the Swiss authorities simply passed this along to Selma's eldest son Jean, living in Switzerland at the time. Had it not been for Jean's perseverance in the conviction that his mother would never have volunteered for anything of the sort, the Swiss authorities would probably have left

it at that. In fact, the latter continued to write to German officials every couple of months to inquire about the Rothschilds. Only after the war, however, did it become known definitively that Selma, Julia, and Armand-Fritz had all been murdered.<sup>56</sup> A year after the Rothschilds, the couple André (b. 1895) and Lucie (b. 1902) Weill were arrested (on July 16, 1943), interned in Drancy a week later, and deported to Auschwitz on July 31, 1943, where they were murdered. As in the Rothschild family case, both German and French authorities answered all enquiries by Swiss diplomats elusively.<sup>57</sup>

Several more Swiss citizens were deported to their deaths during the course of 1943 and 1944. Some were recently naturalized Swiss citizens, for instance, Mariette Limburger-Junès (b. 1865), who had married a Swiss man. She was killed in Auschwitz together with her two daughters, dual citizens.<sup>58</sup> A similar case was that of Ladislaus Goldberger (b. 1907), deported to disappear without trace; the Nazis did not recognize his Swiss citizenship because his naturalization had been recent.<sup>59</sup>

While these deportations took place without identifiable motive, other Swiss Jews in France (like many others, both foreign and French) affiliated themselves with the Resistance. Those caught were generally deported to concentration camps. Among the first Swiss Jews to be deported probably for reasons of political resistance was Louis Ber (b. 1898). He was arrested in Dijon by the German occupation forces on October 9, 1941. In February 1942, Feldkommandantur 669 in Dijon reported to the Swiss Consulate there that Ber had been accused of falsifying documents and had been transferred to Munich by the Gestapo.<sup>60</sup> However, inquiries by the Swiss Consulate in Munich to the Gestapo and the district court there met with no success.<sup>61</sup> In July the DAE thus asked the consul in Dijon to inquire again about Ber, wondering whether he might still be in France. The authorities in Berne had not yet realized that a person transferred to Germany whose location the Germans refused to convey, was most likely in a concentration camp—if not already dead. Moreover, when they later learned that Ber had “died on November 19, 1943 in Brieg,”<sup>62</sup> they could not have known that his actual place of death was more likely the nearby Jewish forced-labor camp that was later converted to a sub-camp of Gross-Rosen.<sup>63</sup> Ber had been deported in the context of December 1941’s Operation Porto, which had targeted members of the Resistance network “Hector.”<sup>64</sup> This network specifically collected intelligence about German military installations, but was infiltrated by agents of the Abwehr, German military intelligence. After attacks on German officers in Paris in September 1941 the Geheime Feldpolizei (military police) arrested 962 individuals in France and Belgium. Thanks to Hitler’s December 7, 1941 *Nacht und Nebel* decree (“Night and Fog,” mandating that no information be released to families or local authorities when a person was arrested for resistance activity), most of those captured in the Porto affair—and not just Ber—vanished without trace.<sup>65</sup>

Another Swiss Jew who served in the French Resistance was Marcel Wyler (b. 1914), a member of a network formed by former Jewish boy scouts (*éclaireurs*) in Mulhouse. He survived the war and the camps to bear witness to what he had undergone after arrest by the Gestapo in Lyon on July 22, 1943. He was first jailed in Fort Montluc for “traveling without permission” (the Swiss authorities knew he actually had possessed a travel permit), and then sent to the internment camp at Compiègne. He was ultimately deported to Mauthausen on March 22, 1944. At the latter camp Wyler managed to get himself registered as an “Aryan.” As Wyler later wrote, this and his knowledge of German that saved his life. He worked in one of the sub-camps of Mauthausen until transferred to the camp at Ebensee as the Red Army approached. Liberated on May 4, 1945, he returned to France, where he later wrote a memoir of these events.<sup>66</sup>



## Dual Citizens, Former Swiss Citizens, and Converted Jews

In other cases the categories of “citizenship” and “race” were not as clear-cut as the Swiss, German, or French authorities would have preferred. Although Swiss citizenship law of the time did not recognize dual citizenship, the authorities seemed to have accepted the principle that as a consequence of the *jus soli* practiced in France—which automatically conferred French citizenship to the children of foreigners born on French territory—such children of Swiss citizens could have two nationalities.<sup>67</sup> A feature of Swiss citizenship law stipulating that women who married a foreigner would lose their original citizenship further complicated matters.<sup>68</sup>

These laws had several, in some cases dire, consequences. Swiss diplomats took the position that they could engage themselves neither for dual citizens nor for former citizens—i.e., women who had lost their citizenship by marriage. In a few cases dual citizens managed to get out of internment camps without the Consulate’s intervention. In certain instances diplomats enquired after arrested people without having established their citizenship. But once it became known that a person had dual citizenship, the diplomats usually ended their efforts. Abram Bernard (b. 1900) was arrested in Paris on September 3, 1941 and detained at Drancy, but was liberated and returned to Switzerland, where he died in 1946 of complications from an infection contracted in the camp.<sup>69</sup> Naville had begun to intervene on Bernard’s behalf, but on October 6, 1941 informed the DAE that he would end these efforts because Bernard had French as well as Swiss citizenship; we know from a newspaper notice that Bernard was released anyway, but no reason was indicated.<sup>70</sup> In another case that I uncovered there was also no intervention by the Swiss Legation in Vichy. Michel-Edouard Dreyfus (b. 1922), the son of the Swiss national Camille Dreyfus, was arrested on December 6, 1943 in Marseille while working for the Union générale des Israélites de France (established by Vichy’s Office of Jewish Affairs to consolidate control over the Jewish population). He was a dual citizen, no authority intervened on his behalf, and on March 7, 1944 he was deported to Auschwitz, where he was killed.<sup>71</sup>

Many of the Swiss Jewish women in France between 1941 and 1944 had lost their citizenship due to marriage.<sup>72</sup> These cases are correspondingly difficult to recover in the Swiss diplomatic archival records. One exception was Robertine Bernheim-Wyler (b. 1879), whose French husband Jules Bernheim died on May 22, 1944. Three days later, she and their two sons were arrested. Through an intermediary, her daughter-in-law contacted a member of the federal government, Swiss Federal councilor Eduard von Steiger, and begged him to ask the Swiss Ambassador in Vichy, Walter Stucki, to intervene on behalf of her mother-in-law. Von Steiger agreed, and on June 21, Stucki tentatively enquired with the German Embassy in Vichy, but by that point Robertine had already been murdered in Auschwitz (the fate of the children remains unclear).<sup>73</sup>

French citizenship law differed from Swiss, allowing women to keep their nationality after marrying foreigners. Lucienne Grumbach-Netter (b. 1892) thus kept her French citizenship when she married the Swiss Armand Grumbach. She was arrested in August 1942, interned in Drancy, and deported to Auschwitz, where she was murdered. Her husband and son, who both had Swiss citizenship, were not arrested (under Swiss law the children automatically received the citizenship of their father).<sup>74</sup> Other French spouses were able to join the repatriation convoys to Switzerland with their Swiss husbands.<sup>75</sup>

Similar confusion reigned in cases regarding the determination of who was Jewish. In several instances, German or French police arrested Swiss citizens who turned out not to be Jewish. Angèle Fallot (b. 1888), for instance, was arrested by the Feldkommandatur in Dreux on July 11, 1942

together with her partner, a Jew from Poland, and interned in Drancy. On November 6, 1942, Naville reported to the Embassy in Germany that she had been released after it was confirmed that she was an “Aryan.”<sup>76</sup> In other cases, Swiss citizens who did not identify as Jews were nonetheless arrested as Jews under Vichy or Reich racial law. After the arrest of Eva Winkelmann-Solowicz (b. 1906, apparently converted to Protestantism) in Annecy on November 16, 1943, her husband wrote to the Federal Councilor and expressed his failure to understand why his wife had been arrested; in fact, she could have repatriated on the September convoy, but she did not consider herself to be in danger. In the event, she was released in March 1944 on condition of her return to Switzerland, where she arrived later that month. The Winkelmanns, as Eva’s husband noted, were “100 percent Aryan,” the couple had married in the Protestant Church, and their two boys had been baptized, which is why the family had not registered for repatriation. The Swiss diplomats, however, followed German and French law in the matter and repeatedly identified Eva as a “Jew.”<sup>77</sup>

Another interesting case was that of Carlo Polla (b. 1898), arrested on June 5, 1944 by the Sipo, detained at Fort Montluc in Lyon, and executed on June 12, 1944 in Dagneux (Ain), most likely because he worked in the French Resistance. His sister Elena Joannot was under the impression that he had been arrested because of his Jewish descent (he had legally changed his name from Pollak in 1941). Upon her demand, the office of the Ministry of the Interior in the Canton of Ticino, where Polla was registered as a Swiss citizen, sent to the DAE the baptism certificates of Polla himself, his parents, and his maternal grandparents in order to document that Polla was Catholic. Karl von Jenner at the DAE, however, wrote the Federal Public Records Office (required to certify Polla was an “Aryan”), insisting that Polla indeed was “Jewish” because his paternal grandparents had been Jewish. The authorities of Ticino were indifferent to contemporary racial definitions of Jewishness, but von Jenner was not. In the event, Jenner’s betrayal (he apparently sat on the documents) was moot: Polla’s execution had taken place weeks before the exchange of the letters, though this became known only in September 1944.<sup>78</sup>

These examples show that various persons in the Swiss federal and cantonal administrations had the opportunity to interpret situations, and that they also sometimes had choices as to the actions they could take. Whether these acted in favor of their fellow (or former) Swiss citizens who happened to be Jewish was often based on individual choice, and in some cases their choices had far-reaching consequences for those concerned.

## Reactions of Swiss Diplomats and the Federal Authorities in Berne

What political and moral assumptions underlay the concrete actions (or inaction) of the Swiss political and diplomatic authorities? Were they willing to accept other states’ application of antisemitic laws against Swiss citizens? Or did they feel that if the Swiss government did not discriminate against its own Jewish citizens, then its representatives abroad did not have to accept other states’ discrimination against Swiss Jews?

One should note the often controversial and conflicting responses of diplomats and other authorities of neutral countries in 1940 and 1941 to the treatment of their Jewish nationals in German-occupied and Vichy France (after they had settled their positions, the matter was not discussed as much). The United States provides one interesting example. Reacting to the anti-Jewish laws in France, on November 8, 1940 the State Department told the ambassador in Germany (the occupying power) to ensure “that American citizens will be exempted from the application of the ordinance in question [in this instance, the German ordinance of September 27, 1940 mandating,



among other things, the registration of Jews and the posting on businesses of signs indicating Jewish ownership] as well as for any other ordinances which may be directed against persons in occupied territory on grounds of race, color or creed.” No foreign power could discriminate against American citizens on racial or religious grounds.<sup>79</sup> The Secretary of State insisted on making this clear to Germany, even after the chargé there, Leland B. Morris, had urged that the wording of the communication was too strong.<sup>80</sup> Turkey, also a neutral, maintained a similar position at that time.<sup>81</sup> Spain’s consul general reassured Spanish Jews living in Paris that no country had the right to treat Spanish citizens differently—but his view was not embraced by the Franco regime, and in the event he had to accept German and Vichy discrimination against Spanish citizens.<sup>82</sup>

In Switzerland, the debate over this question was not between the DAE and the diplomats in Paris and Vichy (as in Spain), but between both and representatives of the Swiss Jewish Community (supported by certain legal experts). The Swiss authorities were well aware of the American declaration refusing to accept another state’s distinction between Gentile and Jewish Americans.<sup>83</sup> However, as early as July 1941 the DAE in Berne informed the Legation in Vichy that the 1882 Establishment Treaty (regulating the settlement of Swiss in France and French in Switzerland) did not provide for any Swiss demand that Swiss Jews in France be treated any differently from non-Swiss Jews. Berne therefore suggested that Swiss diplomats in France should, like their counterparts in Germany and Italy, intervene in particular cases with the goal of “protecting those who could still be protected and speaking out against all discrimination harming our fellow citizens.”<sup>84</sup> They defended this stance in response to a report commissioned by the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities and a report by the legal authority Professor Arthur Homberger holding that on the basis of the treaty of 1882, the French had no right to treat Swiss Jews differently from other Swiss.<sup>85</sup> Stucki had predicted that the Vichy authorities would not feel themselves bound by the 1882 treaty, and felt vindicated when the notorious Xavier Vallat, head of Vichy’s Commissariat général aux questions juives (CGQJ), told him in February 1942 that France did not feel bound by the treaty.<sup>86</sup> In a word, Swiss Jews, their legal representatives, and some others felt the treaty barred France from treating Swiss Jews differently from other Swiss citizens; most of Swiss officialdom, however, interpreted it (as, per Vallat, did Vichy) to mean that France would not treat Swiss Jews any better than it treated French Jews.

Needless to say, Swiss Jews interned in Drancy and their loved ones were disinclined to accept the latter official view. In December 1942, nine interned Swiss Jews, one of them female, addressed Naville in a collective letter requesting the Consul’s intervention with the German authorities to effect their release, and specifically that he adduce the reciprocity recognized in treaties between Germany and Switzerland, and especially the fact that German citizens in Switzerland had never been denied any rights.<sup>87</sup>

If the Swiss government generally accepted the idea of other countries’ discrimination against Swiss Jews, individual actors nonetheless showed varying degrees of concern about the situation of Jewish nationals abroad and the need to do something in order to rescue them. These variations emerged clearly in late 1942 when Naville suggested repatriation of Swiss Jews living in France. According to him, the German authorities had themselves suggested the idea, and other countries had repatriated some of their Jewish citizens. He described the matter as urgent, since the Germans could easily reconsider. Moreover, as Naville stressed to the DAE, about 40,000 foreign Jews and some French Jews had already been deported to “the East.”<sup>88</sup>

Naville’s warning notwithstanding, DAE chief Pierre Bonna replied only six weeks later (on December 29), and only after consulting with the Federal Police (responsible for all border

policy), who took a cool view toward the Jews but didn't specifically seek to block their return. Bonna and his colleagues took the view that repatriations should be taken only if no other solution presented itself; any convoy should include only people already interned or in danger of internment, as well as the elderly, the sick, and children.<sup>89</sup> It was only when Bonna learned from the German legation in Berne that the Germans intended to extend the anti-Jewish measures in France to all Jews that he consented to repatriation, admitting that indeed there appeared to be no other solution.<sup>90</sup>

In January and February 1943, around 200 Swiss Jews repatriated in two train convoys from Paris to Geneva.<sup>91</sup> The federal authorities nonetheless kept up their skeptical attitude toward repatriating Swiss Jews from the now German-occupied Southern Zone of France. Once again, a Swiss diplomat in France (the *chargé*, Sucki's unidentified temporary replacement) had raised the question. In his response to the *chargé*, Bonna reiterated the undesirability of a general repatriation, given the current job market, even though he admitted that the Swiss Jews in France were facing "abnormal difficulties." Contrary to the situation of Jews in the Northern Zone, the situation of foreign Jews in the Southern Zone, in Bonna's opinion, did not require immediate action, with the possible exception of young men subject to deportation for forced labor.<sup>92</sup> Even so, it was only the insistence of the *chargé*<sup>93</sup> that moved the federal authorities to prepare for the repatriation of Swiss Jews from the South—and even so, only if it became "indispensable."<sup>94</sup> And so, in September 1943 around 160 Swiss Jews were in fact repatriated from the Southern Zone.<sup>95</sup>

Another representative of Switzerland who was called upon, if infrequently, to intervene on behalf of Swiss Jews in France was the ambassador in Berlin, Hans Frölicher. Among those involved, he was the one most sympathetic to the Nazi position, and accordingly least sympathetic to his own country's Jews.<sup>96</sup> In September 1942, for instance, he expressed understanding for the German occupational ordinance forbidding Jews to own telephones: it was perfectly acceptable, Frölicher argued, to exclude "parts of the population that appear to be unsafe" from using telephones. He therefore refused Naville's request that he intervene on behalf of Swiss Jews in this matter.<sup>97</sup>

Frölicher also refused to inquire after Swiss Jews who had been accused of infractions and transferred to Germany, for instance, Louis Ber. In May 1942, he saw no reason to address the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning Ber, since the latter had committed a "common law offense (*gemeinrechtliches Delikt*) ... and the previous proceeding has given no cause for complaints."<sup>98</sup> That no one had heard from Ber since February, on the other hand, did not seem to Frölicher "cause for complaint."

### **Did Swiss Authorities Do Enough?**

Criticism of the Swiss authorities' reluctance to react to the arrests of Swiss Jews in France started early and derived from various quarters. Even during the war some recently released victims of internment criticized the Swiss diplomats in France for having done too little too slowly. Gaston Bloch, having been liberated from Drancy and returned to Switzerland, criticized the Consulate in Paris for refusing to help him on the day he was arrested during the second major anti-Jewish roundup in Paris, on August 20, 1941.<sup>99</sup> According to the letter his lawyer addressed to the authorities in Berne, having heard in advance of the roundup, Bloch had telephoned the Consulate to ask them to send a representative to his home to protect him—in vain. Indeed, the letter claimed that it was his own doing that he had been released at all.<sup>100</sup> Naville had reported in November 1941 that Bloch had been liberated after his repeated intervention with the internment camp's chief physician as well as with the German authorities.<sup>101</sup> In reality, it was probably neither Naville's nor Bloch's

efforts that sprang the latter: by November conditions in the camp had gotten so bad that the French authorities, worried about the possibility of epidemic diseases, released about a thousand internees with health problems or with certain passports (mainly Italian, Hungarian, and Romanian—i.e., of Axis friends).<sup>102</sup>

The large majority of the liberated Swiss Jews lodged no complaints, it is true, and in many cases thanked the Swiss authorities for their support. But among relatives of the deported criticism of the authorities was common. Parents, children, and siblings of Louis Ber, Adhémar Wyler, Alfred Krumholz, the Rothschilds Selma, Julia, and Frédéric, or Lucie and André Weill, all of whom were deported to death camps, sent dozens of letters to the Swiss authorities about their relatives, as well as voicing their disbelief that it was not possible to free Swiss citizens.<sup>103</sup> Louis Ber's brother Maurice visited the DAE in December 1943, where he expressed his incredulity, according to an internal report, that the Swiss had not been able to learn the whereabouts of his brother. He suggested that the Swiss authorities should take reprisals against German detainees in Switzerland.<sup>104</sup>

The stock response was that the diplomats and the authorities in Berne had done everything possible.<sup>105</sup> A rare divergence—albeit postwar—appears in a statement by the former head of the Swiss Foreign Police (Schweizerische Fremdenpolizei) Heinrich Rothmund, one of those responsible for Switzerland's restrictive (and antisemitic) wartime refugee policy.<sup>106</sup> When consulted regarding compensation for the Nazis' victims, he wrote in 1954 that had the diplomats stood up to the Nazi authorities, it would have been possible to liberate all Swiss citizens from the concentration camps.<sup>107</sup> Rothmund might have been influenced by a comment by his colleague at the DAE Karl von Jenner, who had criticized the Swiss consul in Lyon, Georg Meyer, in 1944, for the latter's inaction in the case of Carlo Polla: Meyer had left the case to his vice-consul and failed to intervene personally with the German Security Police. According to von Jenner, this was fairly typical of Meyer, who "does not take action in person if it only concerns common people."<sup>108</sup> While von Jenner's observation constituted one of the rare cases of open criticism of a Swiss diplomat during the Nazi period, it certainly should not suggest that in most other cases diplomats did what they could for all people, regardless of who they were.<sup>109</sup>

One can safely say that the Swiss diplomats' hopes of success if they did intervene on behalf of the Swiss Jews in France remained quite low, perhaps realistically so. In an August 20, 1942 letter to the DAE the chargé at the Embassy in Vichy pondered whether protests at the application of French antisemitic measures against Swiss Jews would prove fruitful, since one of his colleagues had heard from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "the principle of eliminating the Jewish element from French economic life" should apply to all Jews, regardless of nationality. According to the chargé, the United States was the only nation to vigorously protest the application of the racial laws against its citizens, but he believed this to have been unsuccessful. Hungary and Portugal had also had to submit to decisions of the French authorities. Thus, he concluded, it would be "very difficult" to obtain an exceptional treatment for Swiss Jews.<sup>110</sup>

Documents of the Swiss consulates show that at least at the beginning of the arrests, diplomats were often slow to react. We see this in the case of Adhémar Wyler (b. 1907), arrested in the Northern Zone on April 3, 1942 for illegally crossing the demarcation line (according to a note in the Consulate's file). Wyler should have completed his sentence by July 20, 1942, after which he should have been interned unless the Swiss Consulate requested his extradition. On July 21, a staff member at the Swiss Consulate telephoned Wyler's attorney, only to learn that Wyler's current location remained unknown and that the attorney had been denied a visit to Wyler on July 16. Naville wrote

on the note that a letter should be sent immediately to the *préfecture*. Two days later, Naville sent a request for information about Wyler to the *préfecture* in Angers, only to learn that Wyler's arrest had most likely been the work of the occupying forces. Only on August 7, 1942 did Naville write the BdS to enquire after Wyler and ask for his release.<sup>111</sup> By this time, however, Wyler had already been in Auschwitz for more than two weeks (as noted, Wyler did survive the war).<sup>112</sup>

Over the course of 1943 the diplomats did react more quickly after realizing (for instance in the case of the Rothschild family) that deportation from France often occurred rather quickly. In the case of Edgar Weil, the Swiss vice-consul in Nice immediately intervened by phone, first with the French and then with the German authorities, after learning of Weil's arrest during a mass roundup.<sup>113</sup> In the case of Jean Ditesheim (b. 1893), arrested in a *café* in Lyon on February 20, 1944 (a Sunday), the consul there wrote to the BdS to learn Ditesheim's whereabouts the following day immediately upon learning of the arrest from his landlord.<sup>114</sup> Both were released and repatriated in March.<sup>115</sup>

The speedier reactions in 1943 and 1944 suggest that the various authorities were increasingly aware of the danger awaiting interned Jews—and perhaps as well of the tidal shift against the Axis in the war. Even though they did not have full and precise information about the concentration camps and death camps, various statements show that they now realized that the deportations spelled the possibility of death. In February 1943 the DAE feared “the worst” for Adhémar Wyler.<sup>116</sup> Some months later, the DAE wrote Ambassador Stucki in Vichy to do his best to liberate recently interned Swiss Jews, motivated now by fear of what deportation portended: “Once these unfortunate victims of persecution are deported, we know from experience that there is little chance of finding them again.”<sup>117</sup> This concern found confirmation a few days later when Ambassador Frölicher wrote from Berlin that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs had informed him that Jews deported “in the context of forced labor” were no longer “being registered,” and could therefore be located only after the end of the war.<sup>118</sup>

## Conclusion

The Swiss authorities and diplomats were dealing with representatives of two regimes who often acted arbitrarily and according to their own agendas, agendas which the latter did not reveal to their Swiss counterparts. While the Swiss upheld common rules of diplomacy, they were confronting regimes that sought to delude the international community regarding their actions against the Jews and other targeted groups.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, the situation of France, under first partial, and then near-total, German occupation—having its own regime in Vichy and being responsible for varying forms and degrees of collaboration with German police structures—complicated diplomacy indeed.

Increasingly the Swiss saw through the lies and prevarications, understood that the arrested and interned Swiss Jews had not committed serious crimes, and realized that the latter were victims of persecution driven by racist ideology. They also came to understand the particular danger for any Jews. Already in spring 1942 Swiss officials had detailed knowledge of mass executions of Jews in the occupied parts of the Soviet Union. After September 1943, they knew of the death camps.<sup>120</sup> As Michael Marrus has observed, however, researchers sometimes fail “to appreciate how difficult it was to grasp the full horror of the Holocaust.”<sup>121</sup>

On the other hand, even though diplomats in France appear to have been more concerned about their Jewish fellow citizens than were the civil servants in Berne, all agreed on the basic principles of dealing with Nazi Germany. The general idea was not to protest openly against the anti-Jewish measures, but to soften their implications through diplomatic interventions in favor of

specific individuals. This strategy, however, meant that whether to help somebody or how to do so depended significantly on subjective inclinations and personal judgments. With time victims and their relatives began speaking out against the tepid approach of several diplomats, urging that clearer and more open protest would do more to save the Swiss Jews.

As throughout Europe, antisemitism had long served as a “cultural code” (Shulamit Volkov) in Swiss society. Alarm at an alleged “Jewification” (*Verjudung*) of Switzerland typified the antisemitism prevailing at that time. A far-reaching consensus among various Swiss milieus agreed that the Jews would not pose a problem as long as their numbers were kept small. Both antisemitism and a more general fear of “over-foreignization” had influenced various migration policies, largely aimed at limiting the number of Jews, since the end of World War I. In the 1930s these policies reduced the chances of the tens of thousands of Jewish refugees trying to escape Nazi terror by fleeing to Switzerland.<sup>122</sup>

The policies aligned with the striking degree to which Swiss authorities accepted National Socialist concepts and terminology. Not only did Swiss authorities thus differentiate between Gentiles and Jews, but they also accepted racist definitions of who should be considered a Jew. Such understandings motivated the reluctance of the DAE to repatriate Swiss Jews. More generally, the war, economic hardship, and uncertainty about the future imposed upon the Swiss authorities many concerns that they felt were more pressing than the safety of their Jewish minority.

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## Notes

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1. “Jewish Losses during the Holocaust by Country,” last updated May 27, 2018, <https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/jewish-losses-during-the-holocaust-by-country?parent=en%2F11652> (accessed January 8, 2021).
2. “Unter der NS-Herrschaft ermordete Juden nach Land,” *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, [http://www.bpb.de/fsd/centropa/ermordete\\_juden\\_nach\\_land.php](http://www.bpb.de/fsd/centropa/ermordete_juden_nach_land.php) (accessed January 8, 2021).
3. Urs Altermatt and Christina Späti, “Neutralität statt Moralität. Die Entschädigung der Opfer des Nationalsozialismus in der Schweiz,” in *Grenzen der Wiedergutmachung. Die Entschädigung für NS-Verfolgte in West- und Osteuropa 1945–2000*, ed. Hans Günter Hockerts, Claudia Moisel, and Tobias Winstel (Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein, 2006), 513–67. See also Regula Ludi, *Reparations for Nazi Victims in Postwar Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
4. Christina Späti, “Denkbarrieren des Sonderfalls. Die vergessenen Schweizer Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Verfolgung,” <https://geschichtedergegenwart.ch/denkbarrieren-des-sonderfalls-die-vergessenen-schweizer-opfer-der-nationalsozialistischen-verfolgung/> (accessed January 8, 2021). See also Balz Spörri, René Staubli, and Benno Tuchschnid, *Die Schweizer KZ-Häftlinge. Vergessene Opfer des Dritten Reichs* (Basel: NZZ Libro, 2019); and *Erzählweisen des Sagbaren und Unsagbaren / Between Commemoration and Amnesia*.

*Formen des Holocaust-Gedenkens in schweizerischen und transnationalen Perspektiven / Forms of Holocaust Remembrance in Swiss and Transnational Perspectives*, ed. Mahoz Azaryahu, Ulrike Gehring, Fabienne Meyer, Jacques Picard, and Christina Späti (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, forthcoming 2021).

5. More precise information on the fate of Swiss Jews in France is not at present possible because of the lack of statistical data.

6. In the following, all sources with signatures that have “E” at the beginning and “\*” at the end reside at the Swiss Federal Archives in Bern. References without document descriptions at the beginning are based on several items in the unit identified.

7. Sources from institutions such as the International Tracing Service or various internet data collections are not always reliable regarding victims’ citizenship, generally listing as “Swiss” anyone born in Switzerland; Swiss citizenship law, however, is not based on *jus soli*.

8. Michael Mayer, “The French Jewish Statute of October 3, 1940: A Reevaluation of Continuities and Discontinuities of French Antisemitism,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 33, no. 1 (2019): 4–22; Renée Poznanski, “Rescue of the Jews and the Resistance in France: From History to Historiography,” *French Politics, Culture & Society* 30, no. 2 (2012): 8–32; Michel Winock, *La France et les Juifs de 1789 à nos jours* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2004), 218–19.

9. Serge Klarsfeld, *Vichy—Auschwitz. Die “Endlösung der Judenfrage,” in Frankreich* (Darmstadt, Germany: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007), 32–33; Susan Zuccotti, *The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 53.

10. Renée Poznanski, *Jews in France during World War II* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2001), 31.

11. Richard H. Weisberg, *Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1996), 37–46.

12. Michael Mayer, *Staaten als Täter. Ministerialbürokratie und “Judenpolitik” in NS-Deutschland und Vichy-Frankreich: Ein Vergleich* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2010), 114–16.

13. Mayer, *Staaten als Täter*, 30. On Aryanization in France, see Martin Jungius, *Der verwaltete Raub. Die “Arisierung” der Wirtschaft in Frankreich in den Jahren 1940 bis 1944* (Ostfildern, Germany: Jan Thorbecke Verlag, 2008).

14. Jacques Picard, *Die Schweiz und die Juden 1933–1945. Schweizerischer Antisemitismus, jüdische Abwehr und internationale Migrations- und Flüchtlingspolitik* (Zurich: Chronos, 1994), 190.

15. See for instance Hermanny Arnet to Swiss Legation in Vichy, November 20, 1940, E2200.42–01#1000/582#6°; Swiss Vice-Consul in Marseille to Swiss Legation in Vichy, October 24, 1940, *ibid*.

16. Zuccotti, *The Holocaust*, 53.

17. Reporting on his activities in 1941, René Naville listed the anti-Jewish measures in the Occupied Zone of France, stressed German insistence that they would apply to all Jews with few exceptions, and stated that his intervention to exempt Swiss Jews had been refused. See “Auszug aus dem Bericht des schweizerischen Konsulats in Paris über seine Geschäftsführung im Jahre 1941,” E2001D#1000/1553#3862°, pp. 62–65.

18. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, vol. II (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 655.

19. The administrator, Héréménegilde Snozzi, held approximately 300 mandates from Swiss Jews for whom he sold businesses and other properties for sums well beneath their actual value; see Beat Balzli, *Treuhänder des Reichs: Die Schweiz und die Vermögen der Naziopfer. Eine Spurensuche* (Zurich: Werd, 1997), 68–69. The story of these Aryanizations remains to be told. See E2001D#1000/1553#3862°.



20. For Turkey, see Stanford J. Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust. Turkey's Role in Rescuing Turkish and European Jewry from Nazi Persecution, 1933–1945* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 112–23; for Spain, Italy, and Portugal see Bernd Rother, *Spanien und der Holocaust* (Tübingen, Germany: Niemeyer, 2001), 139–40; for Switzerland see Picard, *Die Schweiz und die Juden*, 190–93; and Balzli, *Treuhänder des Reichs*, 68–71.
21. Rother, *Spanien und der Holocaust*, 93.
22. Stucki to Swiss consulates in France, June 30, 1942, E2001D#1000/1553#3862°.
23. René Naville (b. 1905) headed the Swiss Consulate in Paris from 1941 to 1944. He had studied law in Geneva, Basel, and Berlin. Having worked for the Federal Department for Foreign Affairs since 1931, he was sent to Paris in 1933 as attaché. See “René Naville,” *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz HLS*, <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/014872/2010-11-02/> (accessed January 8, 2021).
24. Naville to DAE, August 14, 1942, E2001D#1000/1553#3862°.
25. See correspondence in the files “Statut des Juifs,” 1941–1944, E2200.42–01#1000/582#6°; E2200.42–01#1000/586#2°; E2200.42–01#1000/589#2°; E2200.42–01#1000/591#2°; E2200.42–01#1000/593#2°.
26. See for instance Vice-Consul in Marseille to the Swiss Legation in Vichy, June 24, 1941, E2200.42–01#1000/586#2°.
27. Textes relatifs aux Juifs, E2200.42–01#1000/589#2°.
28. Verbal: Téléphone de M. Seydoux du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, October 29, 1940, E2200.42–01#1000/582#6°.
29. Michael R. Marrus, “Coming to Terms with Vichy,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 9, no. 1 (1995): 36.
30. Wolfgang Seibel, *Persecution and Rescue. The Politics of the “Final Solution” in France, 1940–1944* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2016), 219–28; 274–80.
31. No reports on Swiss Jews arrested during the roundup of May 14, 1941 have been found to date. The same holds for other major actions in 1941 and 1942, for instance the Vel d’Hiv Roundup on July 16/17, 1942.
32. On this roundup see Klarsfeld, *Vichy—Auschwitz*, 39–42; Annette Wieviorka and Michel Laffitte, *À l’intérieur du camp de Drancy* (Paris: Éditions Perrin, 2012), 21–32. The action targeted all male Jews in Paris except for U.S. citizens.
33. Naville to DAE, October 31, 1942, E2200.41–04#1000/1684#406°.
34. Naville to Swiss Legation in Berlin, November 18, 1941, E2200.41–04#1000/1684#406°.
35. E2200.41–04#1000/1684#408°.
36. Bernhard Brunner, *Der Frankreich-Komplex. Die nationalsozialistischen Verbrechen in Frankreich und die Justiz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein, 2004), 45–76; Seibel, *Persecution and Rescue*, 274–80.
37. Serge Klarsfeld, *Le calendrier de la persécution des Juifs en France, 1940–1944*, vol. III (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 1695–96.
38. See Swiss Consulate in Paris to Swiss Legation in Berlin, March 30, 1944, E2001-08#1978/107#185°.
39. Brunner, *Der Frankreich-Komplex*, 61–69.
40. On Weil, see below. On the September 1943 anti-Jewish roundup in Nice see Klarsfeld, *Vichy—Auschwitz*, 313–22.
41. Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, *Vichy France and the Jews* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 241–49.
42. E2001-08#1978/107#1000°.

43. E2001-08#1978/107#1041°.
44. Wieviorka and Laffitte, *À l'intérieur du camp de Drancy*.
45. Éric Alary, "Les Juifs et la ligne de démarcation, 1940–1943," *Les Cahiers de la Shoah* 1 (2001): 18.
46. Alary, "Les Juifs", 26; 30–31.
47. E2200.41–04#1000/1684#424°. According to a medical note in his file he had lost thirty kilos and was suffering from severe anemia.
48. E2200.41–04#1000/1685#310°.
49. Liste der Juden, welche nach der Schweiz heimgeschafft werden, January 22 and 27, 1943, E2200.41–04#1000/1687#601°.
50. Weiss and Lévy were among the six Swiss citizens at the camp in Tourelles who addressed the Consulate in Paris on August 1, 1942, citing the Swiss national holiday as an occasion to ask the Consulate to demand their liberation. The other four Swiss were not Jewish. Letter from Camp de Tourelles to Naville, August 1, 1942, E2200.41–04#1000/1687#298°.
51. E2001-08#1978/107#78°.
52. The German authorities gave their permission only in March 1944, when he was finally reunited with his family, who had left for Geneva with the convoy in September 1943: DAE to the Swiss Legation in Vichy, September 30, 1943; and Société Helvétique de Bienfaisance, Paris, to Swiss Consulate in Paris, July 20, 1944, both in E2200.41–04#1000/1687#602°.
53. DAE to Swiss Consulate in Paris, October 25, 1943, E2200.41–04#1000/1687#602°.
54. For instance, Verbal by Naville, February 4, 1943; and Naville to Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD im Bereich des Militärbefehlshabers in Frankreich, February 5, 1943, both E2200.41–04#1000/1685#276°.
55. Notiz betreffend Adhémar Wyler, August 3, 1945, 3, E2001-08#1978/107#1443°.
56. E2001-08#1978/107#1443°. See also Anton-Andreas Speck, *Der Fall Rothschild. NS-Judenpolitik, Opfer-schutz und "Wiedergutmachung" in der Schweiz 1942–1962* (Zurich: Pendo, 2003).
57. Marc Perrenoud, "De La Chaux-de-Fonds à Auschwitz. L'itinéraire tragique d'André Weill," *Traverse* 2 (1992), 230–37.
58. E2001-08#1978/107#1059°.
59. Ibid., #647°.
60. E2200.156–02#1000/241#12°. In a subsequent letter, the Germans alleged that Ber had been arrested under suspicion of spying. Verbalnote Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, March 10, 1944, E2001-08#1978/107#174°.
61. Swiss Consulate in Munich to Frölicher, June 30, 1942, E2200.156–02#1000/241#12°.
62. E2200.41–04#1000/1685#314°.
63. See Bella Gutterman, *A Narrow Bridge to Life. Jewish Forced Labor and Survival in the Gross-Rosen Camp System, 1940–1945* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 241.
64. Six non-Jewish Swiss were also in this convoy. See Fondation pour la Mémoire de la Déportation, <http://www.bddm.org/liv/details.php?id=I.19.#BER> (accessed January 8, 2021).
65. Mazliak Laurent, "What Does the Arrest and Release of Emile Borel and His Colleagues in 1941 Tell Us about the German Occupation of France?," *Science in Context* 24, no. 4 (2011), 596–97.

66. Annex to letter from DAE to the Swiss Legation in Berlin, September 14, 1943, E2200.41–04#1000/1687#602°. Wyler's memoirs, <http://jewishtraces.org/de-montluc-a-mauthausen/> (accessed January 3, 2019; apparently no longer accessible).
67. Ludi, *Reparations for Nazi Victims*, 167.
68. Brigitte Studer, "Citizenship as Contingent National Belonging: Married Women and Foreigners in Twentieth-Century Switzerland," *Gender & History* 13, no. 3 (2001), 627–29.
69. *Gazette de Lausanne*, August 14, 1946.
70. Naville to DAE, October 6, 1941, E2200.41–04#1000/1684#414°.
71. E2001-08#1978/107#458°.
72. This topic features in a number of studies of former Swiss citizens during the Second World War. See Silke Margherita Redolfi, *Die verlorenen Töchter. Heirat als Strafe: Rechtliche Situation und Lebensalltag ausgebürgerter Schweizerinnen bis 1952* (Zurich: Chronos, 2019); May B. Broda, "Auslandsschweizerinnen, ehemalige Schweizerinnen—ihre Rückwanderung aus Deutschland 1939–1948," in *Auf den Spuren weiblicher Vergangenheit*, ed. Arbeitsgruppe Frauengeschichte Basel (Zurich: Chronos, 1988), 251–61.
73. See E2200.42–01#1000/594#448°; list of deported from convoy no. 75, May 30, 1944, *Le Mémorial de la déportation des Juifs de France*, ed. Beate and Serge Klarsfeld (Paris: self-published, 1978), unpaginated; "Tri alphabetique des personnes, mortes en deportation," last updated July 21, 2019, [http://lesmortsdanslescamps.com/monde\\_fichiers/99140.xml?titre=CH](http://lesmortsdanslescamps.com/monde_fichiers/99140.xml?titre=CH) (accessed January 8, 2021).
74. See E2001-08#1978/107#687°. Her son Pierre left a Page of Testimony in her memory at Yad Vashem: "The Central Database of Shoah Victims' Names," *Yad Vashem*, [https://yvng.yadvashem.org/index.html?language=en&s\\_lastName=grumbach%20netter&s\\_firstName=lucienne&s\\_place=&s\\_dateOfBirth=&s\\_inTransport](https://yvng.yadvashem.org/index.html?language=en&s_lastName=grumbach%20netter&s_firstName=lucienne&s_place=&s_dateOfBirth=&s_inTransport) (accessed January 8, 2021).
75. See the files on the repatriation organized by the Swiss Consulate in Paris, E2200.41–04#1000/1687#601°.
76. E2200.41–04#1000/1685#313°.
77. Eva Winkelmann-Solowicz was released on March 3, 1944 and repatriated two weeks later. E2001-08#1978/107#1840°.
78. E2001-08#1978/107#1335°.
79. "The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Germany (Morris)," November 8, 1940, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, General and Europe*, vol. II, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1940v02/d632> (accessed January 8, 2021).
80. *Ibid.*, d634.
81. Shaw, *Turkey and the Holocaust*, 79–80; Corry Guttstadt, *Turkey, the Jews, and the Holocaust* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 189–90.
82. Rother, *Spanien und der Holocaust*, 133–34.
83. Verbal: Swiss Legation in France, October 21, 1940, E2200.42–01#1000/582#6°.
84. Head of the DAE to Swiss Legation in Vichy, July 4, 1941, E2200.42–01#1000/586#2°.
85. Bonna to the Swiss Federation of Jewish Communities, March 27, 1942, E2200.42–01#1000/589#2°; Arthur Homberger to Felix Iselin, November 21, 1941, 1–23, E2200.42–01#1000/586#2°.
86. Stucki to DAE, February 18, 1942, E2200.42–01#1000/589#2°. This did not, however, keep Stucki from referring to the same treaty in 1943 when he protested against a new measure summoning Jews to leave the region of Nice within forty-eight hours. Swiss legation to Ministère des Affaires Étrangères in Vichy, January 11, 1943, E2200.42–01#1000/589#2°.

87. Marcel Adler et al. to Naville, December 1942, E2200.41–04#1000/1684#361°.
88. Naville to DAE, November 18, 1942, in *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland*, vol. 14, ed. Antoine Fleury et al. (Bern, Switzerland: Benteli, 1997), doc. 268.
89. Bonna to Naville, December 29, 1942, in *ibid.*, doc. 268.
90. Bonna to Naville, January 7, 1943, E2200.42–01#1000/591#2°.
91. See E2200.41–04#1000/1687#601°. Around fifteen Swiss Jews remained in Paris: Swiss Consulate in Paris to Swiss Legation in Vichy, December 16, 1943, E2200.41–04#1000/1687#281°. See also Edgar Bonjour, “Die Schweizer Juden in Frankreich 1942/43,” *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 33 (1983), 217–21. Reasons for remaining ranged from old age, bad health, or pregnancy, to the desire to protect one’s property, the need to help family members, or belief in an imminent end to the occupation.
92. Bonna to Swiss Legation in Vichy, February 9, 1943, E2001D#1000/1553#3862°.
93. Chargé ad interim Swiss Legation in Vichy to DAE, March 10, 1943, E2200.42–01#1000/591#2°.
94. DAE to Swiss Legation in Vichy, April 6, 1943, E2001D#1000/1553#3862°.
95. *Journal de Genève*, September 25/26, 1943: 6. According to Stucki, thirty to fifty Swiss Jews stayed in France: Stucki to DAE, November 28, 1943, E2200.42–01#1000/591#2°.
96. In Swiss historiography there is no consensus on Frölicher’s attitude towards National Socialism, See Stephan Schwarz, “Hans Frölicher in Berlin. Zur Diskussion über die Rolle des schweizerischen Gesandten in Berlin, 1938–1945,” *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 58 (2008): 445–67.
97. Frölicher to Naville, September 21, 1942, E2001D#1000/1553#3862°.
98. Frölicher to Swiss Consulate in Munich, May 6, 1942, E2200.156–02#1000/241#12°.
99. The German authorities cited the threat of “Judeo-Bolshevik” resistance after Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union as their pretext (Communist resistance on a significant scale didn’t begin in France until late in the war). Already on the first day of the action, more than 3,000 Jews were arrested. The roundup continued for several days, sending more than 4,000 Jews to internment in Drancy. See Klarsfeld, *Vichy —Auschwitz*, 39–42.
100. Erwin Haymann to EPD (Eidgenössisches Politisches Departement/Department of the Exterior), April 22, 1942, E2200.41–04#1000/1684#406°; Bloch to Haymann, May 12, 1942, E2200.41–04#1000/1684#406°.
101. Naville to Swiss Legation in Berlin, November 18, 1941, E2200.41–04#1000/1684#424°.
102. Wiewiorka and Laffitte, *À l’intérieur*, 44–46.
103. Speck, *Der Fall Rothschild*.
104. Notice, December 18, 1943, E2001-08#1978/107#174°.
105. See for instance EPD to Haymann, April 29, 1942; Naville to DAE, October 31, 1942, E2200.41–04#1000/1684#406°.
106. Heinz Roschewski, *Rothmund und die Juden. Eine historische Fallstudie des Antisemitismus in der schweizerischen Flüchtlingspolitik 1933–1957* (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Helbing und Lichtenhahn, 1997).
107. Cited in Altermatt and Späti, “Neutralität statt Moralität,” 539.
108. Von Jenner, Notice, November 1, 1944, E2001-08#1978/107#1335°.
109. The dozens of files of arrested Jews give the impression that the authorities were more active in favor of those fellow citizens who had connections with politicians such as national councilors (members of the legislature) or members of the Federal Council (the cabinet).

110. Chargé ad interim Swiss Legation in Vichy to DAE, August 20, 1942, E2001D#1000/1553#3862°.
111. E2200.41–04#1000/1685#276°.
112. Wyler was one of the few Swiss Jews deported from France to survive a death camp. After arrival at Auschwitz, he taught masonry to new arrivals in Birkenau (Auschwitz II), and then was transferred to Auschwitz I in late September 1942. See Wyler's report to the Federal authorities after the war: Notiz betreffend Adhémar Wyler, August 3, 1945, 3, E2001-08#1978/107#1443°.
113. Swiss Vice-Consul in Nice to Swiss Legation in Vichy, September 15, 1943, E2200.41–04#1000/1687#604°.
114. Meyer to Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, February 21, 1944, E2200.16–02#1970/31#22°; extrait d'une lettre de Lyon, datée du 6.IV.44, E2001-08#1978/107#435°.
115. DAE to Swiss Consulate in Paris, March 24, 1944, E2200.41–04#1000/1687#604°; and Swiss Embassy in France to DAE, March 23, 1944, E2200.16–02#1970/31#22°.
116. DAE to Naville, February 25, 1943, E2200.41–04#1000/1685#276°.
117. DAE to Stucki, December 3, 1943, E2200.42–01#1000/591#2°.
118. Frölicher to DAE, December 11, 1943, E2200.42–01#1000/591#2°.
119. Ahlrich Meyer, *Das Wissen um Auschwitz. Täter und Opfer der "Endlösung" in Westeuropa* (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010), 187.
120. See the sources at "Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland," <https://www.dodis.ch/en/thematic-dossiers/e-dossier-switzerland-the-refugees-and-the-shoah> (accessed January 8, 2021).
121. Michael R. Marrus, "Bystanders to the Holocaust," in *FDR and the Holocaust*, ed. Verne W. Newton (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 157.
122. Picard, *Die Schweiz und die Juden*, 34–40; Uriel Gast, *Von der Kontrolle zur Abwehr. Die Eidgenössische Fremdenpolizei im Spannungsfeld von Politik und Wirtschaft 1915–1933* (Zurich: Chronos, 1997); Urs Altermatt, *Katholizismus und Antisemitismus. Mentalitäten, Kontinuitäten, Ambivalenzen. Zur Kulturgeschichte der Schweiz 1918–1945* (Frauenfeld, Switzerland: Huber, 1999); Patrick Kury, *Über Fremde reden. Überfremdungsdiskurs und Ausgrenzung in der Schweiz 1900–1945* (Zurich: Chronos, 2003).